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‘THE HARVEST OF DESPAIR’ 
Catastrophic fear and the understanding of risk in the 
shadow of Mount Etna, Italy 
 
Lauren Ware and Lee John Whittington 
  
The Gods laugh in their sleeve  
To watch man doubt and fear,  
Who knows not what to believe  
Since he sees nothing clear, 
And dares stamp nothing false where he finds nothing sure. 
Empedocles Empedocles on Etna, Act I, Scene II, ll.88–92 
(Matthew Arnold, 1852) 
 
Arnold’s poem depicts uncertainty and its relation to fear as a mortal problem. A decade 
later, Longfellow wrote about Mount Etna, but this time, it is the humans at a distance 
who watch ‘with eager eyes’, playing guessing games about when the volcano will next 
erupt, while ‘the old gods, the austere oppressors in their strength, stand aghast and 
white with fear, at the ominous sounds they hear’ from beneath the Sicilian land ‘sown 
with the harvest of despair’ (Longfellow 1893). 
The largest volcano in Europe, far eclipsing Vesuvius, Mount Etna has been the 
subject of reports of powerful activity throughout the classical period, and from the late 
Middle Ages has behaved in a more vigorous fashion than ever before (Chester et al 
2000; Dibben 2008, 289). Its summit sees continuous volcanic activity to this day (Plate 
VI). As with the host of other natural disasters that struck medieval Europe, volcanic 
eruptions and their ‘climate-forcing’ effects (Gerrard and Petley 2013, 1054) have 
inspired detailed attempts, both poetic and analytic, to capture and explain their 
violently unpredictable terror (Chester et al 2000, 184; Rohr 2007). 
In this chapter, we offer an account of fear and risk in anticipation of catastrophe.  
We draw on the narrative response to the Mount Etna volcano to frame an evaluation 
of how fear can be seen to impact the understanding of risk when the event of that risk 
is the catastrophic suffering of an entire community. Our approach is from the field of 
philosophy: we provide a contemporary conceptual analysis of the nature and value of 
both fear and risk in this context in order to consider the extent they play in societal 
responses to natural disasters in particular and to threatening possibilities generally. 
We begin by introducing the philosophy of emotion. Next, the literature concerning 
the philosophy of fear and the philosophy of risk is reviewed. We subsequently 
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then think about human understanding of and responses to natural disasters. We hope 
to show how an exploration of the philosophical questions surrounding the emotion of 
fear and the understanding of risk can contribute to broader, interdisciplinary dialogue 
on the experience of the disastrous and deadly. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMOTION 
 
The vibrant subfield of philosophy of emotion aims to set out the nature and value of 
emotions: what emotions are, what they can do and what—if any—value they have for 
those creatures that can be said to possess or be possessed by them. A starting point  
for philosophical analyses of emotion often consists in setting out what the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for emotion in general are, and then what they are for a specific 
emotion. Consider a given emotional episode: you awaken suddenly to the smell  
of heavy smoke entering your bedroom and leap up to discover your house is on fire. 
There are a variety of things happening to you right now: your heart is pounding, you 
are already heading to the most viable escape, you are making mental scans of where 
your loved ones might be. We can identify in this episode a number of candidate  
components for an emotion: 
 
1. sensory perceptions, or other information-gathering processes 
2. appraisals, or other evaluative processes 
3. physiological changes 
4. conscious feelings of those bodily changes as they occur 
5. attentional processes 
6. action-tendencies and motivations 
7. underlying cares or concerns (Tappolet 2010, 326) 
 
The question then is, which, or which set, of these components are the emotion. What, 
if anything, could be left out without sacrificing the emotion? Within contemporary 
philosophy of emotion, we can identify three broad theoretical camps which offer 
different answers to this question (de Sousa 2013; Solomon 1993). We very briefly 
characterize these camps here, to situate our discussion of the emotion of fear specifically 
in the next section. 
First, there are feeling theories of emotion. The philosopher William James and, 
independently, the physiologist and psychologist Carl Lange were early developers of 
this way of thinking about emotion, sometimes called ‘non-cognitivist’, and the view 
has been championed more recently in analytic philosophy (James 1884; 1890; Lange 
1885; Prinz 2004a; 2004b; Goldie 2009). For the non-cognitivist, bodily changes are 
primary. According to this theory of emotion, upon perceiving the emotion-inducing 
object, our bodies not only change but we also feel those changes (for example, the  
‘pang’ you experience as the adrenaline kicks in; or the sensation of your stomach 
‘dropping’ when you suddenly realise the disconcerting truth; or, more pleasantly, the 
quickening of butterflies in the chest when the one you adore walks into the room);  
our awareness of these bodily changes is itself the emotion. As James asserts, ‘My thesis 
is…that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that 




‘THE HARVEST OF DESPAIR’ 
 
One common criticism that has been put to feeling theories of emotion is that even finely 
tuned accounts of the bodily changes that occur in a given emotional episode are not 
enough to distinguish satisfactorily between emotions that we would intuitively consider 
quite distinct (fear and rage, for example) or between emotions and non-emotional states 
such as fever and asphyxia (Cannon 1929; Schacter and Singer 1962, 28–29; Brady 2013, 
41). 
Second, there are perceptual theories of emotion. According to this model, emotions 
bear sufficient similarity to sensory perception that they can function in the same way as 
perceptions do to constitute reasons or evidence for evaluations of a given situation 
(Döring 2003; Deonna 2006; Tappolet forthcoming). On this account, emotions and 
perceptions: are both typically ‘passive’1; both have representational content—that is, 
‘they present the world as being a certain way, and thus have correctness conditions’ 
(Brady 2013, 48); both share phenomenal properties—that is, in at least paradigmatic 
cases, there is something it is like to feel fear just as there is something it is like to see the 
colour green; both can diverge from our beliefs; and, interestingly, emotions can play a 
role in justifying evaluative belief, in an analogous way to how perceptions can plausibly 
justify empirical beliefs (Brady 2013, 46–48, 69). Whilst perceptual models overcome 
some of the concerns philosophers have with purely feeling theories of emotion, they are 
not without their own difficulties. Michael Brady, for example, has compellingly argued 
in a recent book-length treatment against the perceptual model that the proposed analogy 
between emotions and perceptions central to the model breaks down significantly at the 
epistemic level. In particular, he argues, there are significant disanalogies with respect to 
the way emotions and perceptions relate to attention. Whereas the former ‘capture and 
consume attention’ in a way that can motivate a search for the reasons behind an evaluative 
judgement, perceptions do not (Brady 2013, esp. 5, 45–117). 
Third, there are cognitivist theories of emotion. Three features differentiate emotions 
for the cognitivist: (1) emotions exhibit intentionality, that is, they have objects (for 
example, I am afraid of the tiger, I have admiration for my friend); (2) they are world-
directed, that is, they depict the world as being a certain way, and can therefore be 
assessed according to the correctness condition of whether they fit the world; and (3) 
crucially for the cognitivist, they are characterized by cognitions: judgements, 
evaluations, interpretations, beliefs or appraisals of some kind. On this model, what 
it is to feel fear is—in part—to believe that the object (and emotions must have an object) 
is, for example, dangerous or a threat. One way of motivating this element of fear as an 
emotion would be to ask: would you sincerely be afraid of the tiger’s dangerousness 
without believing that it is, in fact, a dangerous creature? A significant worry arises for 
the cognitivist concerning ‘recalcitrant emotions’: emotions whose belief set appears to 
be in tension with other beliefs the agent holds. As Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson 
(2003, 129) explain, ‘A recalcitrant bout of fear, for example, is one where the agent is 
afraid of something despite believing that it poses little or no danger’ (see also Brady 
2009). Whether recalcitrance can be satisfactorily explained—for example, by reference 
to a distinction between conflict and incoherence, as Bennett Helm (2001, 42) argues, 
or that one of the beliefs of the agent has the decisive influence over the emotion, as 
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For the remainder of this chapter, we will take a cognitivist approach to the emotions. 
Part of our motivation to do so is that emotions understood as containing an evaluative 
component bear a significant relation to our knowledge of value. For, as Brady argues, 
 
[e]motions can inform us about value, as when my feeling of happiness on 
 seeing her again tells me how loveable she is, or when my feelings of suspicion 
let me know that the salesman isn’t to be trusted. Emotions can tell us things 
about ourselves, as when my pride upon hearing about English football  
hooligans rampaging through a European city informs me that I have dubious 
nationalistic commitments, or when my disappointment upon being overlooked 
for the role of Head of Department tells me that I really wanted the job. 
 
  (Brady 2013, 9) 
 
The cognitive model of emotion offers uniquely rich epistemic and educational benefits 
to analyses of our own emotions and the emotions of historical populations. 
One pre-emptory caveat. There exists a ‘persistent cultural script’ that reason and 
emotion are at odds with each other, that emotions are fundamentally irrational or 
threatening to reason (Maroney 2011, 629). This script is as oft recited at various points 
in the history of philosophy as it is in popular discourse. Montaigne (1910, Book 1, Ch. 
17) asserts, ‘there is no emotion that can more swiftly bring our powers of judgement 
out of balance’ than the emotion of fear. Edmond Burke goes further: ‘nothing robs 
consciousness so effectively of all reason as fear’ (Burke 1998, 53; Svendsen 2007, 38). 
Martin Heidegger claims that one ‘loses one’s head’ when afraid, citing cases of people 
discovering their house is on fire and saving whatever objects happen to be near them, 
often items of zero consequence (Heidegger 1976, 342).2 In literature, we have the Bene 
Gesserit Litany Against Fear, in Frank Herbert’s Dune series, which begins, ‘I must not 
fear. Fear is the mind-killer’ (Herbert 1979, 16). And following the Grenfell Tower fire 
in London  in  June  2017,  MP  Michael  Gove responded to public anger at notable 
governmental oversight, and fear regarding similarly constructed buildings throughout 
the city and beyond, with the following: ‘It doesn’t help anyone if we allow—
understandable though it is—emotion to cloud reason’ (Gove 2017). 
The emotion versus reason script is by now, however, established as a false dichotomy 
in philosophy (Jones 2008; de Sousa 2013; Tappolet forthcoming). Here, it will be 
important to distinguish between a cognitive state being a-rational and its being 
irrational. One’s emotional response of fear can, of course, be irrational: for example, 
when I am afraid for ‘no good reason’, or more afraid of the object than it is worth. This 
is not, however, because that response is an emotion, but rather ‘because our rational 
grasp of the world is so often, in this as in other respects, fallible; after all, our beliefs can 
also be irrational, when they are not properly grounded in or proportional to the relevant 
evidence’ (Duff 2015, 193). We can therefore understand emotions to be rational (as 
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THE PHILOSOPHY OF FEAR 
In his essay on fear and the supernatural, Lovecraft writes: 
 
The oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest 
kind of fear is fear of the unknown. […] The unknown, being likewise the 
unpredictable, became for our primitive forefathers a terrible and omnipotent source 
of boons and calamities visited upon mankind for cryptic and wholly extra-
terrestrial reasons, and thus clearly belonging to spheres of existence whereof we 
know nothing and wherein we have no part. 
 (Lovecraft 1927, 12) 
 
How can we begin to assess whether fear of cataclysmic disaster is appropriately 
grounded in reality when it is taken to be the effect of (superhuman?) forces beyond our 
control, or proportional to the relevant evidence when the disastrous event in question 
is unpredictable, or worse, has never happened in living memory? The philosophy of fear 
aims to articulate what fear is and does: what distinguishes it from other emotions, and 
how it operates in our lives. In what follows, we review the philosophic literature on fear 
in light of these questions, focusing on four areas of the discourse: fear-as-information 
theory; the intentional object of fear; fear and creative problem-solving; and the 
motivations of fear. 
First, the emotions-as-information theory maintains that emotions can function as 
sources of information about the world (Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Clore 1983; Brady 
2013, 118–191). Fear can tell us something about reality, in particular by capturing and 
sustaining our attention. It has been seen that emotion aids in information-gathering, 
to the extent that motivationally relevant objects and events receive greater attention. 
Further, fear improves the speed at which we notice these elements in our environment 
(Lang and Davis 2006). That fear directs our focus to such objects has clear prudential 
benefits from an evolutionary perspective. What can be more troubling for 
contemporary audiences, however, is when this attention can also blind us. Fear during 
a search test—for example, when participants are asked to visually locate a particular 
image on a screen of various images—leads to an impairment in  the subjects’ ability to 
detect targets at the periphery of the screen, when compared to response times for 
participants in neutral or positively valenced emotional states, like amusement or 
contentment (Derryberry and Tucker 1994; Weymar et al 2013). Further—and perhaps 
more problematic when considering how fear might impact disaster planning and 
preparedness or disaster mitigation—we see that when people are afraid, they 
demonstrate a cognitive bias that favours ‘local’ rather than ‘global’ attention and 
information-processing: judging images to be more similar when they exhibit more 
superficial rather than broader associative connections (Kimchi and Palmer 1982, 521–
535; Fredrickson and Branigan 2005). Fear constricts attention. This can pose a 
problem when ‘the future, as a field of possibilities, is restricted since one directs one’s 
attention solely’ or significantly to a present threat at the expense of attention to and 
reflection on what is ‘all-things-considered’ important to us, or to long-term planning 








Figure 8.1 People fleeing from the tsunami wave in Hilo, Hawaii, in 1946 (USA) 
	
Another way in which fear can tell us something about reality is, as Brady argues, by 
its motivating a search for the reasons behind that fear (Figure 8.1). When we feel afraid, 
our fear not only draws our attention to the source of the fear and possible means of 
escape, but we also scan for further information to confirm or deny whether our fear is 
and continues to be justified. Relatedly, fear can function as a source of information by 
prompting an assessment of the “evaluative information” that the fear itself provides 
(Brady 2013, 101–109). If part of fear involves evaluations of, or beliefs about, its object, 
being surprised by fear in a given context can encourage us to seek out further 
information to confirm or deny whether those evaluations and beliefs are accurate and 
appropriate. 
The second element of the philosophy of fear we want to highlight concerns fear’s 
intentional object. Two conceptual claims arise from the literature. First, perhaps 
uncontroversially, part of the cognitive content of fear is that its objects are evaluated as 
dangerous, harmful, or in one way or other a threat to the fearer. Note that our fear at 
this perceived threat can be unfounded (we can err in our assessment of the object as a 
threat), and fearsome objects need not be real (the eldritch horror imagined in the dark 
really is what is feared).3 What is important, though, is that this threat be to something 
we care about. As F H Bradley (1930, §63), put it, ‘The man who has ceased to fear has 
ceased to care’. More recently, Martha Nussbaum explains (see also Nussbaum 2015, 
44): 
 
I do not go about fearing any and every catastrophe anywhere in the world,  
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important ways. What inspires fear is the thought of damage impending that  
cuts to the heart of my own cherished relationships and projects.                               
                                                     (Nussbaum 2001, 30–31, 53, note 23) 
	
A second, perhaps controversial, conceptual claim about fear’s intentional object is that 
it is always forthcoming—a view particularly common in medieval theories of fear 
(Knuutila 2018, 14–17; King 2009, 169–173). Fear always contains a projection about 
the future, an assumption or prediction of a negative or painful future situation 
(Svendsen 2007, 38–39). While it might sound intuitive to fear, in the afternoon, having 
left the ironing board on before leaving the flat in the morning, we argue this is either 
not fear or it is fear of a future situation. Consider the following: I am uncertain right 
now whether my flat burned down this morning. There are two possibilities. If my flat 
burned down in the past, and as follows, is burned down now, fear is not fitting: it is 
fitting, perhaps, to be angry (at myself, or at the iron), or to be sad (at the loss of my 
possessions); if I am genuinely afraid, it is of how I’ll get by without a flat, or how I will 
pay for the damage I caused, and is therefore fear of a future pain. If my flat did not burn 
down in the past, and as follows is not burned down now, fear is also not fitting. As 
Hume (1739, 2.9) emphasizes, ‘Tis evident that the very same event, which by its 
certainty would produce grief…gives rise to fear when only probable and uncertain’. 
Third, we can see that emotions create different mental sets that are more or less useful 
for certain kinds of problem-solving. Happiness, for example, facilitates a mental set 
useful in creative tasks in which one must think flexibly, intuitively, or expansively—
such as inventing novel uses for everyday items (Fiedler 2001, 85–98). Sadness (Figure 
8.2), whereas, better conduces to the mental set in which problems are solved more 
slowly, with particular attention to detail, and through deliberate and more focused 
strategies (Isen et al 1987, 1122–31). Tibor Palfai and Peter Salovey (1993, 57–71) have 
argued that these two different styles of processing fit themselves to different kinds of 
problem-solving: ‘positively valenced’ emotions making one better at inductive problems 
such as analogical reasoning, and ‘negatively valenced’ emotions making one better at 
deductive logical tasks. 
Of particular interest to discussions about how fear might impact imaginative 
problem-solving is the work of Alice Isen and her colleagues, and the more recent debates 
that have ensued from this work. Two findings have become so robust that they are now 
sometimes used as ‘affect checks’ (that is, checks that participants are experiencing the 
emotion a study requires them to experience): first, that people in whom positive emotion 
is induced are found ‘to give unusual (but reasonable) first associates, and have    a more 
diverse set of associates, to neutral words’, and to produce artistic creations that are 
judged as more creative (Isen et al 1985, 1413–26; Hirt et al 1996, 245–261; Fieldler 
2001).4 However, when fear-inducing words or images (spiders are a frequent example) 
are used, these numbers drop dramatically (Neubert et al 2017). It is plausible to suggest, 
then, that while fearsome situations attract and sustain attention to the source of a threat, 
that attention may also limit our abilities to be successful in creative problem-solving to 
mitigate it. 
We should note at this point that an increasing number of theorists object to 








Figure 8.2 A mother visiting her house in Avezzano destroyed by the 1915 Fucino earthquake (Italy) 
	
basis of their being ‘pleasant’ or ‘painful’, or else to abandon the categories entirely and 
treat individual emotions as they stand (Elster 1999, 40; Kristjánsson 2003; de Sousa 
2013). We discuss painful emotions below. 
This brings us to the fourth area of philosophic debate we will highlight: the  
relation between fear and motivation to action. Thucydides (1910, I.75.3) famously listed 
fear as the strongest and ‘principle motive’ to political action, followed by honour, and 
then by plunder. One of the key differences between a cognitivist theory of  
emotion and feeling and perception theories is that for the latter two theories, emotions 
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194; Tappolet 2010, 335). The problem seems to be then, that while fear ‘involves a desire 
to avoid harm or loss, [it is] not at all clear whether achievement of this goal would 
necessitate selling one’s stocks, listening to the weather report, or running away’ (Clore 
1994, 111). 
One of the methods to generate situationally specific motivation is to look to the 
appraisal component in cognitivist theories. If beliefs about the nature of a fear-object 
(what you believe it can do to you, and how) are part of the emotion itself, this provides a 
mechanism for fear to be goal-setting and thus, action-guiding (Tappolet 2010, 335). A 
further strand of research on the emotional motivation of fear concerns the motivational 
power of pain. Brady has, for example, recently argued that painful emotions—including 
fear—motivate both towards epistemic goals (goals of understanding and of intellectual 
virtue) and prudential goals (goals of well-being and of moral development) in a way that 
‘outperform[s] rival motivational elements’ (Brady 2013, 146, 149–150, 189; Brady 
2018). As Lovecraft acknowledged, ‘we remember pain and the menace of death more 
vividly than pleasure’ (1927). This leads us to as-yet unresolved tensions in the philosophy 
of emotion: if fear is action-guiding, and painful fear motivational towards the active 
development of moral and intellectual virtue, can it legitimately be cultivated (or imposed) 
for the benefit of the individual, or of a society (Bain et al 2019)? 
We might consider here cases, historical or contemporary, where it appears a fitting 
intentional object of fear is not receiving the attention it ought. For example, interviews 
carried out in 2003 with inhabitants of Trecastagni, a large agricultural village located 18 
km south-east of the summit of Mount Etna, reported that ‘immediate problems—in this 
case unemployment and the journey to work—were more to the forefront of public 
concern than the more remote risks posed by volcanic activity’, despite the volcano 
erupting three months prior to the survey. The eruption threw up a column of ash so thick 
it could be seen from space, and footage of the eruption was recorded and used to form 
part of the hellish landscape of the volcanic planet of Mustafar in the 2005 film Star Wars: 
Episode III—Revenge of the Sith, yet ‘lack of social life’ was mentioned more than twice as 
frequently as the volcano when residents were asked to list three major sources of concern 
facing the city (Chester et al 2008, 224; Davis and Ricci 2004; Davis et al 2005; Dibben 
2008). Is this a matter of fear regarding immediate, local concerns (getting to work on 
time) getting priority over plausibly more significant concerns (destruction of the village)? 
Or is it sanguinity regarding the volcano allowing for long-term planning (a life with 
friends and a good transit system)? Dibben (2008) has argued that reminders of heightened 
risk can function to ‘encourage the search for information to support the validity’ of a 
decision to inhabit a dangerous area. We now turn to the philosophy of risk to set the 
scene for an analysis of how fear impacts on imagination in the evaluation of disaster risk.	
	
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RISK 
 
The philosophy of risk is an area of research that attempts to understand the nature  
of risk and apply this understanding to topics ranging from technological ethics to 
epistemology (theories of knowledge). Unfortunately, definitions of risk are extremely 
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to disagreements over how one should go about measuring and understanding risk. 
However, a list of the most widespread definitions includes: 
 
§ an unwanted event which may or may not occur (Rosa 1998) 
§ the cause of an unwanted event (Möller 2012) 
§ the statistical expectation value of unwanted value (Campbell 2005; Willis 2007) 
§ the probability of an unwanted event (Graham and Weiner 1995) 
 
What most of the current definitions of risk do tend to agree on is that risk is a 
measurement of probability of some event that is undesirable. The way in which a risk 
assessor might arrive at this measurement depends upon the way in which they measure 
the probabilities. For example, the statistical probability of some unwanted event occurring 
is measured by calculating the frequency of which that event has occurred in the past. 
Alternatively, one might employ a Bayesian understanding of probability, where we start 
with a prior credence (degree of belief represented as a probability) that some event will 
occur, and as we gain more experience, we update that credence using Bayes’ theorem 
(Joyce 2016). Both of these methods also have their variations, for example, objective or 
subjective Bayesianism, or are used in tandem with each other, for example using 
frequentist methods to ascertain Bayesian priors. Hopefully this demonstrates why there 
are so many definitions of risk, and why it is difficult to offer anything other than a general 
definition. 
However, we want to raise a problem for thinking about risk in terms of probabilities. 
The problem is the idea of a near miss, which cannot feature as part of the probabilistic 
analysis. To give an example, imagine a stretch of road that has so far had relatively few 
accidents, but regularly has near misses where an accident comes extremely close to 
happening. The question is, is this road dangerous, i.e., high risk? We would think that 
the answer to this question would be yes, but it is not entirely clear how the probabilistic 
accounts of risk can accommodate this thought. Maybe they could include these near 
misses into the probability calculation, but this just appears to be a calculation of the risk 
of a near miss, which in themselves are not unwanted events, and certainly not the same 
as the unwanted event of a car accident. 
Even if we could somehow include the near misses as part of the probability calculation, 
what would be lacking from such a solution is an explanation of how near misses and 
actual unwanted events are related in such a way that warrants including near misses in 
the calculation in the first place. To use our dangerous road example again, in order to 
warrant using the ‘nearly accidents’ alongside the actual accidents in the probability 
calculation, we need some explanation of how ‘nearly accidents’ and actual accidents are 
related. 
To further deepen the problem, even if we could offer that explanation (and we  
think that we can), that explanation would just act as the risk assessment itself, prior  
to the need to include any probabilistic risk assessment. Back to the road example—if  
we offer an explanation of why lots of near misses mean that the road is dangerous,  
i.e., indicators that an accident could easily occur, then that explanation we offer will  
be good enough as a risk assessment of the road, without the need to even look at any 
probabilities. In fact, this is the way most of us do risk assessments in our everyday  
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around making probability calculations, but instead are armed with complex causal and 
counterfactual explanations and narratives about how the world works around us which can 
often function just as well (or better) as genuine risk assessments compared to any of the 
probabilistic analyses. 
Let’s call this view of risk the counterfactual explanation view of risk. A similar view has 
been put forward by Duncan Pritchard (2015). This view of risk assessment holds that risk 
is a measurement of how easily an event could occur using what philosophers call modal 
semantics. The idea is that for all the ways in which the world is, there are plenty of ways in 
which the world could have been. For example, although you had coffee this morning, you 
could have had tea. Some of these ways in which the world could have been are more 
‘modally/counterfactually close’, or could have more easily occurred, than others, because 
less dramatic changes overall need to occur. If you like tea and coffee and it just happened 
to be the case that you whimsically chose coffee this morning, the possibility that you could 
have chosen tea is modally closer than say if you really disliked tea and you choosing tea 
would have also required significant changes to your overall tastes and constitution. 
In the same way, for the road where near misses often occur, it is counterfactually close 
that a real accident could occur—as not much would have to happen in order for an accident 
to occur. We can see this in explanations such as: ‘if she hadn’t swerved at the last second, 
she would have crashed’, or, ‘if I had taken my eyes off the road for half a second, that could 
have gone really badly’. These are counterfactual explanations, as they are statements about 
what easily could have been. But also note that they are risk assessments as well. By stating 
that something unwanted could have easily happened, we are also stating that there was a 
high chance of an unwanted event, even though at no point do we invoke probability. So 
counterfactual explanations act both as an explanation of why there is a risk, and as 
assessments of the risk itself. 
How does this understanding of risk provide insight into cases of historical disasters? A 
key component of the counterfactual explanation view of risk is the role that the imagination 
and our perceptions of the world play in accurately assessing the risks involved. After all, if 
we fail to imagine how that near brush with death could have easily gone much worse, then 
it looks like we are failing to accurately assess the risk involved in what just happened and, 
importantly, will fail to adjust our behaviour. Conversely, we might be a bit too prone to 
over-imagine what might happen to us, meaning that we may assess the risks too highly. 
Either way, what the imaginative role in the counterfactual explanation view does make 
clear is that if we want to understand how other people, in the past or the present, assessed 
and felt about the risks around them, it is important to try to understand their worldview 
as much as possible, in particular the kind of things they imagined could happen to them, 
and the kinds of things they could not have imagined could easily happen to them. 
	
IN THE SHADOW OF DISASTER: 
THE INTERACTION OF FEAR AND RISK 
 
When we think about how people anticipate and experience natural disasters, a  
number of areas from the above analysis of fear and risk begin to interact. Natural disasters 
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that they are extreme, unpredictable, unprecedented, or even unimaginable. Such events are 
fitting objects of fear. In this section, we will look at two ways in which fear regarding disasters 
of this kind impacts on how individuals may imagine and understand the risk of these 
disasters, drawing on natural disasters in medieval Catalonia (Spain) and the Danube River 
region. 
First, research in the empirical philosophy and cognitive science of fear consistently 
demonstrates that experiencing fear makes negative, painful or harmful outcomes appear 
more likely to occur (Johnson and Tversky 1983; Mayer et al 1992). We have a 
psychological tendency to focus our attention on negative rather than positive events 
(Svendesen 2007, 54–59), and this manifests in making negative events in the future appear 
more salient to us and—crucially, given the counterfactual view of risk above— appear closer 
to us. The thing is, we are already not very good at calculating odds, statistics and 
probabilities generally (compared to other cognitive tasks, like using our imagination). 
Furthermore, as research by Johnson and Tversky (1983) on fear and risk demonstrates, when 
we are experiencing fear, our abilities to assess the likelihood of a negative risk event occurring 
becomes even worse. Fear also tends to lead us to regard information about high-risk events 
as more reliable than information about low-risk events (Svendesen 2007, 55). When we 
think about and imagine sweeping, calamitous and highly deadly disasters outside of our 
control and predictability, two things might happen: we might over-evaluate their possibility 
of occurring; or we might focus on entirely the wrong source or scope of the immediate 
danger, as our ability to think creatively about the disaster (to imagine the possible ways it 
could impact us, and therefore what precautionary or mitigation strategies to invoke) has 
become constricted by fear.  
The local reactions to the May 1448 earthquake in Catalonia, the last of the medieval 
destructive earthquakes in the region, offer an intriguing example of the former interaction 
of fear and risk evaluation. Following the earthquake, residents of Santa María de Mataró 
‘spontaneously and almost immediately’ turned to the bishop of Barcelona to obtain a licence 
to collect alms to repair the Mataró parish church, and, later, appealed to Queen María 
using the earthquake and the damage it had caused, not only to the parish church but to 
three additional churches (in the nearby villages of Sant Andreu and Sant Vicenç de 
Llavaneres, and the hermitage of Sant Miquel de Mata), as an argument for both significant 
funds and changes to policy which would confer them greater municipal autonomy (Salicrú 
i Lluch 1995, 510–511). The privilege was granted. The account communicated by the 
inhabitants of Mataró was of a devastating disaster with knock-on risks for future damage. 
Nevertheless, the measures expended for the township were uncharacteristically 
advantageous, especially given that the damage to the neighbouring villages and  
hermitage was far less tragic than in Mataró. That the town was able to secure this benefit 
could be explained by the fear inspired by the earthquake damage making the risk  
of a future tragedy appear closer than it might otherwise be evaluated. As Salicrú i  
Lluch (1995, 509–510) notes, two factors came into play during this earthquake that  
resulted in a high death toll and severe damage: firstly, it occurred in the middle of  
the night, when there would have been less time to realise what was happening and escape 
safely; and second, reports from the royal bailiff and bishopric (Català 1990; Salicrú  
i Lluch 1993) demonstrate that many of the dwellings, castles and monasteries in the  
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necessarily correlate, then, with a higher intensity earthquake. Furthermore, the benefits 
obtained by the privileges granted covered wide-ranging negative events, including possible 
attacks by pirates on land or sea. If fear elicited by disastrous results makes one judge 
similarly negative events to be more likely in the future (even if they are not), and if 
information about high-risk events is judged as more reliable than other evidence (even 
when it is not), we can see the success of Mataró’s petition understood as more than simply 
clever or opportunistic. Their success drew on the interaction of fear and a risk evaluation 
that made more negative future predictions appear more likely, and more fundable—
which in this case worked for the benefit of the township.  
     A second way in which fear regarding disasters can impact the understanding of their risk 
concerns the role of the imagination. If we can see, as in the above, that fear impacts our 
understanding of risk as calculated as a matter of probabilities, we can ask now how it might 
impact our understanding of risk that includes counterfactual possibilities. If what is 
involved in this account of risk is imagining, creatively, the kinds of things that could 
possibly happen in the event of an unpredictable or unprecedentedly powerful natural 
disaster, we need to now think about how creativity responds to fear. What we have seen is 
that fear tends to focus our attention on immediate, local concerns and threats, at the 
expense of attention to associated, broader concerns—including unlikely, unprecedented 
ones. Understanding how fear can limit our imagination in these ways may be constructive, 
then, in ensuring a space for creative deliberation about natural disasters: their variety of 
sources, even the unexpected or unlikely ones; their possible impacts, including those 
outside our immediate circles of concern; and their future mitigation, strategies for which 
may involve listening to a wider variety of voices and sources. 
Describing the Danube ‘millennium flood’ of 1501, Rohr (2005, 72) notes that it is 
important to consider what he calls the ‘mentalities’ of the people involved in order to 
interpret their perception of such disasters. ‘Mentalities’, he writes, ‘are horizons of 
experience and the sum of all the factors determining the possibilities (and also the 
impossibilities) of thinking and acting in a given situation or in parts of that society’ (Rohr 
2005, 72).5 If fear in response to a disaster is not treated or processed appropriately, it 
could lead to a limiting of those horizons and therefore a weakness in determining such 
possibilities and impossibilities. An example of this might be in choosing to stay in the 
home, even once its usual and immediate means of egress have been blocked, rather than 
imagining alternative escapes through more unconventional or unfamiliar means. 
However, in the wake of the great flood, right across the area we see something novel—
for the first time, people began to mark the water level, with sometimes elaborate and even 
poetic devices, as in this example from Linz:	
SVM NOTA QVANTA FVIT VNDARVM CONSPICE MOLES  
PALVSTRIS VATES CVIVS AVIS FVERAT 
QVE TANTO SEDIT MESTISSIMA TEMPORE TECTIS 
DILVIVM QVANTO TEMPORE TRISTE FVIT 
 
Look, I am the sign, how much the flood has been,  
whose witness has been a bird from the swamp,  
which sat just in this very sad time on the roofs,  
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The creation of these memory markers as part of the ‘mental management’ of the floods 
offers a fascinating use of public artistry to respond to a disaster. The flood of 1501 was 
by far the largest of the Danube River and its catchment area during the second 
millennium—unprecedented in living memory and as statistically unlikely as a swamp 
bird perching on the rooftops. By marking the flood level it kept the possibility of such 
a flood a live possibility in people’s minds, which, as Rohr notes, could have positive 
benefits not only for future planning, but for coping with the disaster—to recall, for 
example, that it had been worse in the past and the building still stands. 
For the historian or archaeologist interpreting local responses to disasters, this 
understanding of fear’s impact on imagination and risk could account for what appear 
to be short-sighted, unprepared, nostalgic or even irrational local strategies.  As Gerrard 
and Petley (2013, 1071) demonstrate in their analysis of environmental risk 
management in the Middle Ages, the disasters these populations experienced were ‘social 
constructions’ based on their understanding of what constitutes a risk and how to 
calculate it, just as it is today (Davis et al 2005; Dibben 2008, 289). 
What may have occurred in historical cases of unsuccessful risk management was— 
again, as in our time—a focus on precedents and probabilities, at the expense of 
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1 This is perhaps an ancient inheritance from the Greek pathos (‘that which happens to a person or thing’, 
as Liddell and Scott 1940, have it), but see Solomon 2003. 
2 Though see Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: ‘one should hold fast to one’s heart; for if one lets it go, how soon 
one loses one’s head, too!’ (1891). 
3 We will not discuss fear of fictional objects any further—not because they are too frightening, but 
because the rich literature on the topic deserves much more space than we are able to offer in summary. 
On the central questions within this literature, see, still, Carroll 1990. Given the ingredients of myth, 
superstition and narrative in medieval responses to disaster—on which see, e.g., Rohr 2007, and Patch 
1918; as well as (in relation to environmental hazards generally) Gerrard and Petley 2013, and (and in 
relation to Mount Etna specifically) Chester et al 2000; 2008, who challenge the perception that these 
kinds of narratives are somehow pre-rational and so unlike our contemporary response to disaster—
philosophic debate on ‘the paradox of fiction’ would benefit significantly from further interdisciplinary 
research on narratives in disaster discourse. 
4 See Isen 1999 for a thorough discussion of these topics. 
5 Rohr remarks on the lack of records showing ‘desperation, anger, fear or similar emotions’ (81) in the 
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